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Why Can’t We Be “Friends”?
A Call for a Less Stringent Policy for Judges
Using Online Social Networking
Brian Hull*
Judges are increasingly using social networking websites like Facebook, Twitter,
LinkedIn, MySpace, and Google+, and, naturally, the question arises: What are the
ethical limits for judges doing so? A number of judicial ethics committees and others
knowledgeable about judicial ethics have analyzed this question. Not all, however,
were familiar with the nuances of online social networking. The California Judges
Association falls into both of these categories. In November 2010, it released an
advisory opinion, Opinion 66, describing its views on judges using social networking
sites.
This Note details the views expressed by Opinion 66 and by opinions from Florida,
Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. Opinion 66 stated
that a judge may not include an attorney in her online social network if the attorney is
appearing before the judge—a view shared by Florida and Oklahoma but rejected by
Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin. This view typifies the failure of
Opinion 66 to appreciate that the current ethical rules allow a judge to be online
“friends” with an attorney appearing before her. This failure stemmed in part from a
lack of recognition that an online connection is not indicative of a close connection.
Other analytical flaws were the inexplicably higher standard for online contact and the
lack of appreciation of how social networking sites work. Opinion 66—and all of the
other opinions on this subject—also failed to appreciate the benefits of allowing judges
to use online social networking, including transparency, outreach, and even enforcing
the ethical rules.
This Note argues that the California Judges Association can, and should, release a new
opinion further analyzing the use of social networking sites by judges.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012; B.A., University
of California, San Diego, 2008. I would like thank the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their
hard work editing this piece. I would also like to thank Will Mosley for his helpful comments and
guidance through the Note-writing process. Another important set of people to thank are my close
friends and family for their support and understanding, not only while I was writing this Note but
throughout law school. Finally, I would like to give a special thank you to Aria Link for her constant
support, helpful comments, patience, and excellent feedback during the Note-writing process.
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Introduction
Social networking websites are becoming extremely common and
judicial ethics committees are finally taking notice. In November 2010,
the California Judicial Ethics Committee of the California Judges
Association (the “California Committee”) released an advisory opinion,
Opinion 66, concerning “what ethical constraints arise when a judge
1
participates in online social networking.” Opinion 66 analyzed three
issues: (1) whether a judge may be “a member of an online social
networking community,” (2) whether a judge may include in her online
social network lawyers who might possibly appear before her, and
(3) whether “a judge [may] include lawyers who have a case pending

1. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 1 (2010).
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2

before the judge” in her online social network. It answered the first two
questions with “a very qualified yes” and answered the third question
3
with a “no.” The California Committee, however, was not the first to
act: It followed committees in several other states, which had released
ethics opinions after judges inquired about the propriety of being
4
members of various social networking sites. Organizations governing
judicial ethics in other states should (and probably will) release opinions
5
about online social networking soon. These opinions are important;
judges need to know what they can and cannot do on social networking
6
sites. Online social networking is extremely popular in the United States
7
and the number of people using it continues to grow. This number
8
includes over forty percent of current judges. The number of judges
9
using social networking sites is also growing and will continue to do so.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2010-06 (2010) (clarifying and
answering questions about an earlier opinion, Op. 2009-20); Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary,
Formal Op. JE-119 (2010); Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009); N.Y.
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009); S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial
Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009); see also Adrienne Meiring, Ethical Considerations of Using Social
Networking Sites, Ind. Ct. Times, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 10, 10–11 (answering whether Indiana judges can
use social networks and discussing the ethical considerations of using these sites); Richard J.
Sankovitz, Can’t We Be Friends? Judges and Social Networking, Third Branch, Winter 2010, at 10,
10–11 (2010) (discussing how judges in Wisconsin—including the author, a judge at the trial court
level—are using Facebook, and giving an unofficial opinion about judges using online social
networking). Adrienne Meiring, counsel to the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications,
explained that she wrote the column “to address some of these routine ethical questions [about online
social networking]” that had been asked by a number of judges. Meiring, supra, at 10.
5. Ohio released an opinion shortly after California released Opinion 66. See Sup. Ct. of Ohio
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7 (2010). Oklahoma released an opinion in
mid-2011. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011).
6. The ABA is considering amending the rules for attorneys. See Steven Seidenberg, Seduced:
For Lawyers, the Appeal of Social Media Is Obvious. It’s Also Dangerous, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2011, at 48,
50 (“The working group [of the ABA Commission on Ethics] is studying ethics issues arising from
lawyers’ use of social media and other technologies . . . and may even recommend significant
amendments to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
7. As of June 2010, approximately 66% of online American adults had visited a social
networking site in the last thirty days. See Experian Simmons, 2010 Social Networking Report 2–3
(2010). This number increased from 53% in 2008 and 27% in 2007. Id. at 3.
8. Conference of Court Pub. Info. Officers, New Media and the Courts: The Current
Status and a Look at the Future 65 (2010). It is necessary to note that the data gathered in the
report suffers from possible design flaws. There was a low response rate (less than one in ten
respondents completed even part of the survey and only about one in twenty completed the survey in
its entirety) and the “electronic-only survey tool” (what may be called the request for information)
was “distributed on [an] e-mail-distribution system.” Id. at 64. It seems this biases the survey numbers
to those who check their email regularly (the survey was open for only a week) and who would
complete an online-only survey. Furthermore, “judicial officers” (judges, magistrate judges, or
administrative judges) accounted for just 31.4% of the completed surveys. Id. With the expansion of
social networking sites, however, there is still a good reason for states to release opinions regardless of
the numbers of judges using them: The number of judges using these sites will continue to rise.
9. See Ginny LaRoe, Local Judges Put Social Media on Trial, Recorder (S.F.), May 23, 2011, at
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This is especially true because lawyers who were students at the time of
the online social networking explosion are going to be the next
10
generation of judges.
Other than the handful of opinions released by ethics advisory
boards, there has been little legal scholarship on the ethics of judges
11
using social networking sites. This Note does not try to answer every
question relating to judges using online social networking. In the process
of analyzing the California decision, however, this Note highlights many
of the issues faced by judicial ethics committees.
This Note will explain why the California opinion is flawed both
from a legal perspective and as a matter of policy. Part I provides a brief
description of online social networking. Part II analyzes the advisory
opinions released by California, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wisconsin to illustrate different
interpretations of the propriety of judges using online social networks.
12
Part III examines the California Code of Judicial Ethics, authoritative
interpretations of the California Code, and the interpretations of judicial
ethics codes in other states to show why Opinion 66 is flawed in the way
it interpreted the law. Among other faults, it applied the applicable
language far too strictly. Part III will also explain why Opinion 66 is
wrong as a matter of policy. The opinion neglects to consider the
potential of online social networking to increase transparency in the
court process, educate the public, and improve the conduct of attorneys
and fellow judges. It also created a potentially perverse situation in which
a judge could be found to be exhibiting bias despite the lack of any actual
bias. Part IV of this Note proposes solutions that the California

5, (discussing recent appointees’ use of online social networking and the use of Twitter by judges who
have been on the bench for some time). Ethics committees and others are taking note and discussing
the ethics of judges using social media. See Judicial Ethics and the Intersection of Social Media and the
Courtroom, Nat’l Jud. C., (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.judges.org/news/news081511.html (discussing
briefly the lack of consensus regarding the use of social media by judges and a forthcoming
presentation “devoted to ethical concerns of the use of social media by judges”).
10. See LaRoe, supra note 9. In addition, this conclusion is based on data showing that, as of Fall
2009, 69% of Americans aged thirty-five to forty-nine and 88% of Americans aged eighteen to thirtyfour have visited a social networking site within the past thirty days. See Experian Simmons, supra note
7, at 3. America’s future judges are included in that data.
11. See James J. Alfini, Future Trends in Judicial Ethics: The Influence of Cyberspace, 51 S. Tex.
L. Rev. 851, 851 (“In the coming years, there will be a compelling need to address new circumstances
with creativity, greater attention to rigorous analysis of judicial ethics provisions (particularly
appearance of impropriety) by state high courts in deciding judicial misconduct cases, and an increased
emphasis on judicial education.”); Angela O’Brien, Comment, Are Attorneys and Judges One Tweet,
Blog or Friend Request Away from Facing a Disciplinary Committee?, 11 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 511, 525
(2010) (discussing three state ethics opinions concerning judges’ use of social networking sites and
analyzing the applicability of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to judges’ use of social media).
12. This examination includes the analysis of the canons in David M. Rothman, California
Judicial Conduct Handbook (3d ed. 2007).

Hull_63-HLJ-595 (Do Not Delete)

January 2012]

WHY CAN’T WE BE “FRIENDS”?

12/26/2011 4:02 PM

599

Committee should consider, including a call for the Committee to issue a
new opinion that is more detailed and nuanced.

I. Social Networking Websites
13
There is a wide variety of social networking websites. The most
14
15
16
17
widely used are Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and MySpace . There
18
is also a site on the rise called “Google+”. These sites all have distinct
features, although, to a degree, their features are becoming remarkably
similar. In addition, all of the sites allow users to restrict much of the
personal information that can be seen by others.
19
Facebook is the most used site for social networking. A user
creates a profile that contains personal information about her; this may
include, among other things, interests, education, contact information,

13. Conference of Court Pub. Info. Officers, supra note 8, at 28–29, 37 (describing Facebook,
MySpace, LinkedIn, Ning, Twitter, Tumblr, Plurk, and mentioning other sites such as MyYearbook,
Bebo, and BlackPlanet). Technically, sites such as Twitter are “microblogging” sites, but these sites
are often mentioned when discussing popular sites that create possible ethics issues for attorneys and
judges. See id. at 37–39; see also O’Brien, supra note 11, at 512–14 (2010) (introducing Facebook,
MySpace, and Twitter in a comment intended to explore ethical issues for attorneys and judges);
Daniel J. Crothers, Judicial Use of Social Media, Nasje (Jan. 26, 2011), http://news.nasje.org/?p=142
(discussing from the perspective of a North Dakota supreme court justice the concerns about ex parte
communication occurring on social networking sites).
14. Facebook has more than 800 million active users. Statistics, Facebook,
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). About 143 million of
these are in the United States. Facebook.com, Quantcast, http://www.quantcast.com/facebook.com
(last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
15. Twitter had more than 200 million users as of April 2011. Shea Bennett, How Many Users
Does Twitter Have? 200 Million! No, Wait, 362 Million! Uh, Split The Difference?, Media Bistro,
http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/how-many-twitter-users_b13110 (Aug. 26, 2011, 6:00 AM).
About sixty-eight million of these are in the United States. Twitter.com, Quantcast,
http://www.quantcast.com/twitter.com (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
16. LinkedIn had more than 120 million users as of August 4, 2011; this number is increasing at a
rate of two members per second (which is more than 600,000 per week). LinkedIn Press Center, About
Us, LinkedIn, http://press.linkedin.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
17. MySpace has about nineteen million users in the United States. Myspace.com, Quantcast,
http://www.quantcast.com/myspace.com (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). This number continues decline as
the other online social networks grow. See id. (charting the decrease in the number of visitors to
MySpace each month).
18. See Claire Cain Miller, Another Try by Google to Take on Facebook, N.Y. Times, June 29,
2011, at B1, (discussing Google+ as a new social networking service). At least twenty million people
have signed up for Google+. Scott Cameron, Google Plus: Do You Need Another Social Network?,
NPR (Aug. 6, 2011, 6:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/talk/2011/08/06/138828455/google-plus-doyou-need-another-social-network. It is difficult to document how many unique visitors Google+ has
because the site is tied to Google.com, which is the most trafficked site in the United States. See
Google.com, Quantcast, http://www.quantcast.com/google.com (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). There has
been an increase in the number of unique visitors to Google.com since Google+ was released but it is
difficult to say whether that increase is due to Google+ or something else. See id. (charting the number
of visitors, with an increase beginning in June).
19. Facebook has the most users of the five sites mentioned and the most users in the United
States. See supra notes 14–18.
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20

and work history. Each user, as part of the profile, also has a “wall:” “a
place to post and share content with . . . friends” including photos,
21
videos, links, application content, and a user’s own status. Users with
profiles can “friend” or “add as a friend” other members of Facebook,
22
provided that the other person accepts the “friend request.” Once
“friends,” a user can “tag” the other in a photo they see; post a comment,
23
link, or video on the other person’s wall; and much more. Facebook, in
a sense, is driven by having friends. Users can also follow “pages”:
profiles for public figures, bands, universities, athletes, companies, and
24
celebrities. Following a page (also called becoming a “fan” of a page) is
essentially a one-way friend request—the page administrator does not
screen requests, although the administrator may remove people who
25
“like” or follow it.
Each Facebook user also has a home page that includes the News
Feed, a “constantly updating list” of information about the user’s
“friends” (or pages followed), including posts, photos tags, friend
requests, event RSVPs, group membership, and status updates (and
26
possibly comments by users). If this is not enough, nearly all of these
20. Factsheet, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?factsheet (last visited Dec. 23,
2011). Facebook, however, is not sitting idle; the site is continuously changing. Recently, it announced
a new format for user profiles, called the “timeline.” See Barbara Ortutay & Michael Liedtke, Facebook
Redesigns Profiles, Adds “Timeline,” Associated Press (Sept. 22, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/
facebook-redesigns-profiles-adds-timeline-175250945.html. The development may lead to changes in
other online social networks, but this Note’s analysis and basic descriptions of the sites are still
relevant.
21. Facebook Help Center, What Can I Do on the Wall? (Timeline), Facebook, http://
www.facebook.com/help/?faq=224964477515963 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
22. Facebook Help Center, How Do I Add a Friend?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/
help/?faq=146466588759199 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
23. How Tagging Works, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/about/tagging (last visited Dec. 23,
2011).
24. Discover Facebook Pages, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/pages (last visited Dec. 23,
2011).
25. Press Release, Who’s Sharing on Facebook?, Facebook (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.facebook.com/
press/releases.php?p=87889; Facebook Help Center, How Do I Remove Someone Who Is Connected to
My Page?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=222702104422027 (last visited Dec. 23,
2011). It is also possible to follow something without “liking” it. See Ortutay & Liedtke, supra note 20
(“We are making it so you can connect to anything you want. . . . [Y]ou don’t have to like a book, you
can just read a book.” (quoting Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg)).
26. See Facebook Help Center, What Is News Feed?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/
help/?faq=210346402339221 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011); Facebook Help Center, What Types of Content
Can Appear in News Feed?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=211104095587055 (last
visited Dec. 23, 2011). In addition, Facebook allows a variety of applications to be installed: from
games to quizzes to filling out March Madness brackets. Recently, the site even launched a service to
send reminders of court dates to litigants in Philadelphia. Facebook Help Center, What Is an App on
Facebook?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=217453588274571 (last visited Dec. 23,
2011) (listing examples); Kara Mignanelli, Friend Request! The District Court Wants to Be Friends on
Facebook, Social Axcess (Aug. 5, 2011), http://socialaxcess.com/2011/08/05/friend-request-thedistrict-court-wants-to-be-friends-on-facebook/ (discussing the plans of Philadelphia’s First Judicial
District to send reminders of court dates to litigants via text message, Facebook, and Twitter); see, e.g.,
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things can be “liked”: a simple click for a user to tell the rest of Facebook
27
that she “likes” whatever that is.
There is also a somewhat recently developed feature of Facebook
28
called the “friendship page.” This page shows the common history of
two “friends,” including posts on each other’s walls, events both users
29
attended, pictures together, and things both people have “liked.” This
page can also be seen by any user who is “friends” with both people—
provided that both people’s privacy settings allow the information to be
30
shared with their other “friends.”
31
Twitter is a site where users post “tweets” of 140 characters or less.
Similar to a Facebook’s wall-posting feature, Twitter users can also
32
include photos, videos, links, or other content as part of a tweet. In
addition, some use Twitter “simply . . . as a way to get the latest
33
information on their interests.” Importantly, each user may choose to
follow particular accounts (possibly a friend, celebrity, business, or a
34
news source) to see what those users have tweeted. The tweets show up
on the user’s “Home Timeline”—a collection of the tweets of the people
35
the user follows, from most recent to least recent. This may also include
36
“retweets”: one user’s tweets rebroadcasted by another user. Twitter

Quiz Creator, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/thequizcreator (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (offering
a quiz-making app); CBSSports.com Brackets, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/apps/
application.php?id=5713520924 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (offering a March Madness bracket app).
There is even dedicated space for games on Facebook. What Are the Application Dashboard and the
Games Dashboard?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=219209578106339 (last visited
Dec. 23, 2011).
27. See Facebook Help Center, What Is the Like Feature?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/
help/?faq=200273576682757 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (“‘Like’ is a way to give positive feedback or to
connect with things you care about on Facebook. You can like content that your friends post to give
them feedback or like a Page that you want to connect with on Facebook.”). Of course, despite this
description, just because someone “likes” something does not necessarily mean they are giving it
positive feedback.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Facebook Help Center, Who Else Can See a Friendship Page Between Me and One of My
Friends?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=185127274870484 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
31. Twitter Help Center, Twitter 101: How Should I Get Started Using Twitter?, Twitter,
http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/104-welcome-to-twitter-support/articles/215585
(last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
32. Twitter Is the Best Way to Discover What’s New in Your World, Twitter, http://twitter.com/
about (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
33. Id. Indeed, many judges, including Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, use Twitter as a
news source. LaRoe, supra note 9.
34. Twitter 101: How Should I Get Started Using Twitter?, supra note 31.
35. Twitter Help Center, What Is a Timeline?, Twitter, http://support.twitter.com/articles/164083
(last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
36. Id. To make this clear, say Person A is following Celebrity B. Celebrity B decides to retweet
an article posted by Company C. While Person A does not follow Company C, the article that
Company C tweeted may be seen in the “Home Timeline” of Person A. This, of course, does not have
to be a link to an article or a video but may be just a regular tweet.
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users also can see who a particular user is following and who follows that
37
user (though this can be restricted). Twitter is a bit different from the
other social networking sites mentioned in that following is not mutual:
“Someone who thinks you’re interesting can follow you, and you don’t
38
have to approve, or follow back.” Overall, Twitter focuses less on the
39
social networking aspect and more on being a forum for people to post
what they think or have read—a characteristic mentioned by many of the
ethics opinions.
40
LinkedIn is the largest online professional network. It is a site
where professionals (and students) can network by inviting one another
41
to “connect.” A user makes a profile that contains her professional
42
experience, goals, education, and other information. Similar to
Facebook, a user can post a “status,” though these are intended to be
43
“professional updates.” There are also “groups” on the site, places
44
where users can comment on or follow threaded discussions. The
LinkedIn site even has a “guide” for attorneys, which includes a
recommendation that users post “timely legal commentary” in an area of
45
the site called “LinkedIn Answers.” LinkedIn also has a feature to
46
allow a user to see who has viewed her profile. Again, though, the
emphasis on this site is that the connection is a professional relationship.
37. Twitter Help Center, What Is Following?, Twitter, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31twitter-basics/topics/108-finding-following-people/articles/14019 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
38. Id.
39. This may be changing, especially among attorneys. See Jay Shepherd, Small Firms, Big
Lawyers: Twitter and Business Cards at the ABA TechShow, Above the Law (Apr., 15, 2011, 11:35
AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/04/small-firms-big-lawyers-twitter-and-business-cards-at-the-abatechshow/ (discussing how lawyers network by trading Twitter usernames).
40. See LinkedIn Learning Center, What Is LinkedIn?, LinkedIn, http://learn.linkedin.com/whatis-linkedin/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2011); LinkedIn Press Center, About Us, LinkedIn,
http://press.linkedin.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). This is one distinction between the online
social networks: LinkedIn markets itself as a professional network more than as a social network, but
this distinction is based simply on the site’s intended use, not its actual use. As discussed in this Part,
LinkedIn’s features are remarkably similar to those of the other sites.
41. LinkedIn Help Center, Building Your Professional Network, LinkedIn, https://help.linkedin.com/
app/answers/detail/a_id/348/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (describing how to make connections).
42. LinkedIn Learning Center, Profiles, LinkedIn, http://learn.linkedin.com/profiles/ (last visited
Dec. 23, 2011).
43. Id.
44. LinkedIn Learning Center, Groups, LinkedIn, http://learn.linkedin.com/groups/ (last visited
Dec. 23, 2011).
45. LinkedIn Learning Center, Attorneys, LinkedIn, http://learn.linkedin.com/attorneys/ (last
visited Dec. 23, 2011). LinkedIn Answers is an area where questions about a large number of areas
(such as business travel, conferences and event planning, health, hiring and human resources, law and
legal services) can be posed and then answered by users of the site. LinkedIn Answers, LinkedIn,
http://www.linkedin.com/answers (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). One of these sections is “Law and
Legal,” which has subdivisions of corporate law (which has further divisions), criminal law,
employment and labor law, property law, and tax law. LinkedIn Answers, Law & Legal Questions,
LinkedIn, http://www.linkedin.com/answers/browse/law-legal/LAW (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
46. “Who’s Viewed Your Profile” Overview and Privacy, LinkedIn, https://help.linkedin.com/
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MySpace is another social networking site that, although in decline,
47
is still in use. Some, however, may hesitate to call it a social networking
48
site anymore. Nevertheless, it is important to discuss when examining
judicial ethics because “MySpace is still rather popular among
49
individuals who end up in the criminal justice system.” In addition,
commentators and most of the advisory committees still mention
50
MySpace when discussing social networking sites. Furthermore, a judge
pro tem lost his position because of his MySpace profile after it was
51
discovered that the profile suggested a bias against prosecutors.
MySpace is similar to Facebook in that users create profiles, play
games, post updates, and follow the progress of their “friends” doing
52
these things. The only real differences between MySpace and Facebook

app/answers/detail/a_id/42 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
47. See Dawn C. Chmielewski & David Sarno, Once-Trendy MySpace Hits an Awkward Stage,
L.A. Times, June 17, 2009 (Business), at 1 (noting that the number of MySpace users is declining and
projected to fall further); Brandon Dimmel, MySpace CEO Abandons Ship as Site’s Popularity
Diminishes, Infopackets (Feb. 12, 2010, 10:29 PM EST), http://www.infopackets.com/news/
internet/2010/20100212_myspace_ceo_abandons_ship_as_sites_popularity_diminishes.htm (stating that
the popularity of MySpace is declining); see also John D. Sutter, Praise for MySpace’s New Look—But
That Logo?, CNN (Oct. 27, 2010, 14:48 GMT), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/TECH/web/10/27/
myspace.revamp/ (“Everyone knows MySpace has fallen on hard times in recent years . . . . [It is]
repositioning itself not as a social network . . . but as a ‘social entertainment destination for Gen Y.’”).
The site is called “MySpace,” “Myspace,” or “My______” depending on where you look. See id. (using
all three of the terms while discussing the newest, which is “My_____.”). For simplicity, I will refer to it
as “MySpace” throughout this Note.
48. See Sutter, supra note 47 (“[MySpace] seems to be emphasizing [promoting bands and
celebrities on video- and audio-heavy pages] and largely abandoning the social network aspects of the
site.”). The company itself has said it does not want to compete with Facebook, but instead would
prefer to be a complementary service focusing on music and, to a lesser extent, movies, television, and
video games. Alexei Oreskovic, MySpace Launching New Version of Website, Reuters (Oct. 27, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE69Q11M20101027.
49. Derrick Harris, How Social Media Is Pushing the Limits of Legal Ethics, GigaOM (Feb. 26,
2011, 12:00 PM), http://gigaom.com/2011/02/26/how-social-media-is-pushing-the-limits-of-legal-ethics/
(quoting Jennifer Lynch, a staff attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation).
50. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 1 (2010); Ethics Comm. of the
Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119 (2010); Sankovitz, supra note 4, at 10; Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7, at 5 (2010).
51. K.C. Howard, MySpace Judgment: Guilty, Las Vegas Rev. J. (Aug. 13, 2007, 10:00 PM),
http://www.lvrj.com/news/9121536.html (last updated Sept. 26, 2008, 4:38 PM) (discussing how, in 2007,
a substitute judge in North Las Vegas was dismissed for appearing to have a bias against prosecutors
by listing one of his interests as: “Breaking my foot off in a prosecutor’s ass . . . and improving my
ability to break my foot off in a prosecutor’s ass.”).
52. See What’s New with the Myspace Homepage, MySpace, http://www.myspace.com/
guide/homepage (last visited Dec. 23, 2011); Find Friends, MySpace, http://www.myspace.com/help
(enter “Friends” into the search box, then follow the link with the same name) (last visited Dec. 23,
2011). It also has an option to import a user’s Facebook interests and sync updates with Twitter,
Facebook, and YouTube. See Import Your Interests, Mashup with Facebook, MySpace,
http://www.myspace.com/guide/mashup (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (detailing the importing of interests
from Facebook); Sync with Facebook Twitter and Youtube, MySpace, http://www.myspace.com/
guide/sync (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (explaining how to sync interests). Note that “YouTube” is a
video sharing site, not a social network. See About YouTube, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/t/
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are that MySpace has a different layout, a different user base, and a
different emphasis.
53
Google+ is the newest of the social networks and is on the rise. It
54
can be summarized as a combination between Twitter and Facebook. A
55
user can follow others as on Twitter, post updates, photos, links, and
56
other features similar to Facebook. Also, users can “+1” a post or
article located on various other sites (for example, an article on
57
sfgate.com, the website for the San Francisco Chronicle) —similar to
“liking” on Facebook.

II. The Issues Addressed by Advisory Opinions
No judge has been punished for using an online social network in
violation of the canons of the California Judicial Code of Ethics—at least
not yet. This can be shown by reviewing the annual reports of discipline,
which are released by the California Commission on Judicial Performance.
The Commission’s disciplinary actions include public removal, public
censure, public admonishment, private admonishment, and advisory
58
letters. No published disciplinary measure explicitly mentions an online
59
social network or implicitly refers to social networking activities.
about_youtube (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
53. See supra note 18. But see Paul Tassi, A Eulogy for Google Plus, Forbes (Aug. 15, 2011, 10:54
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2011/08/15/a-eulogy-for-google-plus/2/ (predicting that
Google+ will not last long because it is too similar to Facebook); Paul Tassi, The Rise of the Google
Plus Faithful, Forbes (Aug. 15, 2011, 3:45 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2011/08/15/therise-of-the-google-plus-faithful/2/ (predicting that perhaps Google+ will last but will not become more
popular than or “destroy” Facebook).
54. Matt Hartman, The Google+ Double Filter Model, Nonsequitorial (Aug. 13, 2011),
http://matthartman.tumblr.com/post/8865698480/the-google-double-filter-model.
55. About Circles, Google+, http://www.google.com/support/+/bin/static.py?hl=en&page=
guide.cs&guide=1257347&rd=1 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
56. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also How To, Google+, http://www.google.com/
support/+/?hl=en (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
57. About the +1 Button, Google+, http://www.google.com/support/plus/bin/static.py?page=
guide.cs&guide=1207011&answer=1047397 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
58. Rothman, supra note 12, § 12.85 (3d ed. 2007).
59. The California Commission on Judicial Performance has issued some private admonishments
and advisory letters responding to conduct that perhaps could have taken place on an online social
network or that could occur over social networking sites in the future (forwarding an email could be
similar to posting on a wall or posting as a status). See, e.g., Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance,
2009 Annual Report 18 (2009) (“During trial, a judge contacted one of the counsel’s supervisors ex
parte to criticize the attorney’s performance.”); Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 2008
Annual Report 26 (2008) (“A judge used the court computer to forward to judicial officers a satirical
e-mail that promoted negative stereotypes about people from a certain country, apparently realizing
that it would be offensive to at least one judge whose ancestors were from that country.”); Cal.
Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 2007 Annual Report 32 (2007) (“A judge participated in an ex
parte communication by email with a district attorney about a pending case.”); Cal. Comm’n on
Judicial Performance, 2006 Annual Report 32 (2006) (discussing ex parte communications without
discussing the precise manner in which they occurred, leaving open the possibility that they occurred
online); Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 2004 Annual Report 22 (2004) (“A judge engaged
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The California Committee considered three main issues in Opinion
66: (1) the propriety of a judge being a member of an online social
network, (2) the propriety of a judge including in her online social
network lawyers who might appear before her, and (3) the propriety of a
judge including a lawyer in her online social network while the lawyer
60
has a case pending before the judge. Other states, including Florida,
Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
Wisconsin, also have considered these questions, though some have
phrased them differently or have combined the analysis of the
61
questions. As this Note focuses on the California decision, it will
consider the questions as addressed by the California Committee.
Before analyzing the decision, it is important to understand the
framework of judicial ethics in California and function of the California
Committee. All members of the California judiciary must comply with
62
the California Code of Judicial Ethics. The Committee has “studied
questions presented to it by judges, and has occasionally given formal
63
opinions.” The California Supreme Court and the California
Commission on Judicial Performance “give weight to these opinions,
64
especially the Formal Opinions.” The Committee developed this
reputation by frequently providing informal advice to judges and by
65
releasing annual “Judicial Ethics Updates” for judges. Currently, there
is no case in which the California Supreme Court or the Commission on
66
Judicial Performance has disregarded the Committee.

in extensive use of a court computer during court hours over a period of at least two years for a
purpose specifically prohibited by court policy.”).
60. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 1 (2010).
61. See generally Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011); Ethics Comm. of the
Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119 (2010); Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances &
Discipline, Op. 2010-7 (2010); Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009); N.Y.
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009); S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial
Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009); Meiring, supra note 4 (the Indiana “unofficial opinion”); Sankovitz,
supra note 4 (the Wisconsin “unofficial opinion”).
62. Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics pmbl. (2009); see also Rothman, supra note 12, § 1.30, at 13
(noting that compliance with the Code is mandatory). Rothman notes that there was dispute as to
whether the Code was mandatory before 1996, despite its application by the California Supreme Court
in judicial conduct cases, but it is now clear that it applies to all members of the judiciary. Rothman,
supra note 12, § 1.30, at 13 n.27; see also id. § 12.82 (discussing the importance of the California Code of
Judicial Ethics).
63. Rothman, supra note 12, § 12.83, at 662.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. By this I mean exactly that: There are no cases that disagree with the reasoning of the
Committee. There have been changes in the rules, which supersede opinions released by the
Committee. That clearly is some kind of disagreement, but it is difficult to say it was with the
Committee itself because the Committee was just interpreting the existing rule. As one looks through
the reasons expressed for changing the rules, however, there is never a reference to explicitly
superseding an opinion by the Committee.
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A. May Judges Use Online Social Networking?
1. California
The first question the California Committee addressed in Opinion
66 was whether a judge could “be a member of an online social
67
68
networking community.” It answered “a very qualified yes.” After
69
looking at Canon 4A of the California Code of Judicial Ethics and its
commentary, it advised that judges could “use technology to accomplish
70
what is otherwise permissible under the Code.” Next, the opinion
71
discussed the ethical limits of five “unique issues” posed by the use of
72
technology necessary for online social networking. First, it noted how
comments on social networking sites are not private but are like any
73
other public comment a judge may make. The Committee added that
74
this means Canon 3B(9) controls what a judge may “say” (post, tweet,
75
and so forth) online. The other four “unique issues” related to other
aspects of the Code of Judicial Ethics and were all essentially reminders
76
to judges about the public nature of social networking sites. Opinion 66
cautioned judges against violating Canon 4A by casting doubt on their
ability to act impartially and reminded judges not to exhibit bias or
77
demean the judicial office. The opinion further discouraged both
impermissible online political activity, in violation of Canon 5, and
lending the prestige of the judicial office to advance the personal
78
interests of the judges or others.
To address this first issue, the Committee highlighted the
differences between interaction on social networking sites and
interaction face to face. Opinion 66 stated that for a judge to avoid

67. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 1 (2010).
68. Id.
69. Canon 4A states: “A judge shall conduct all of the judge’s extrajudicial activities so that they
do not (1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially; (2) demean the judicial
office; or (3) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.” Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics
Canon 4A (2009).
70. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 3–4 (2010).
71. The Committee noted that this was not an exhaustive list. Id. at 4.
72. Id. at 4–6.
73. Id. at 4–5.
74. Canon 3B(9) prohibits “public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any
court” and “nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing.” It
allows the judge to discuss legal education programs and cases in appellate courts, as long as the
comments or discussion will not interfere with a fair hearing of the current case. Cal. Code of
Judicial Ethics Canon 3B(9) (2009).
75. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 4–5 (2010).
76. Id. at 4–6.
77. Id. at 5 (citing Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 2A) (using Canon 2A as a baseline for
what is acceptable and warning judges that they must always act in a manner “that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”).
78. Id. at 5–6.
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casting doubt on her ability to act impartially, the judge has an
affirmative obligation to frequently check and remove, repudiate, or hide
79
comments made by others that may be distasteful or offensive. While
discussing the duty to uphold the reputation of the judicial office, the
Committee colorfully declared:
Online activities that would be permissible and appropriate for a
member of the general public may be improper for a judge. While it
may be acceptable for a college student to post photographs of himself
or herself engaged in a drunken revelry, it is not appropriate for a
80
judge to do so.

The Committee found that using features of a social networking site,
like creating a link to an organization or commenting on a proposed
81
legislative matter, may constitute impermissible political activity. The
discussion about lending prestige did not mention anything specific to
technology, though the opinion noted that if a post is associated with the
judge, then the post would fall under Canon 2B—meaning the judge
would have to avoid “post[ing] any material that could be construed as
82
advancing the interests of the judge or others.”
2. Other States
Every other state that released an opinion relating to online social
83
networking has approved of social networking use by judges. Most
committees appeared to do so without much reservation. The New York
Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics said it “cannot discern anything
inherently inappropriate about a judge joining and making use of a social
84
network.” It even recognized there are several reasons a judge might
85
want to join such an online community. The New York Advisory
Committee thought the true question was “not whether a judge can use a
86
social network but, rather, how he/she does so.” The New York opinion
added that posts on a profile page (either the judge’s or another user’s)
may violate its Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, and referenced an
opinion specifically advising a court not to link to the website for an

79. Id. at 5.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 5–6. The opinion presumably uses the same definition of “political organizations” as
does the Code of Judicial Ethics, meaning “political party, political action committee, or other group,
principal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment of candidates to nonjudicial
office.” See Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Terminology. In addition, by “proposed legislative
measure” the opinion surely means legislative measures not related to “improvement of the law, the
legal system, or the administration of justice.” See id. Canon 5.
82. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 6 (2010).
83. See supra note 61.
84. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009).
85. Id.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
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87

advocacy group for Megan’s Law. The Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory
Committee agreed that the state’s ethics code does not forbid using social
88
networking sites, but noted that using online social networking could
89
lead to violations, depending on the content of the judge’s post. Ohio
also declined to take issue with a judge using social networking sites,
although the state’s Board on Grievances and Disputes noted, “[A]
judge’s participation on a social networking site must be done carefully
in order to comply with the ethical rules in the Ohio Code of Judicial
90
Conduct.” Oklahoma echoed these statements, noting a judge may use
online social networks but the judge “must not use the [online social]
network in a manner that would otherwise violate the Code of Judicial
91
Conduct.” The opinion emphasized that the conduct must not create
the perception the judge engaged in conduct that reflects adversely on
92
93
her impartiality. Unofficial opinions issued in Indiana and Wisconsin
echoed the New York and Ohio opinions: Participation in online social
networking is permissible as long as judges do not violate another part of
94
the code. The South Carolina Advisory Committee even seemed to
encourage judges to be members of social networking sites because doing
so “allows the community to see how the judge communicates and gives
95
the community a better understanding of the judge.”
The opinion issued by the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky
Judiciary expressed the most reservations as to whether judges may use
online social networking and answered the question with a “Qualified
96
Yes.” It dealt with the question fairly quickly, though, explaining that
87. Id.
88. Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009) (“The [Florida] Code of
Judicial Conduct does not address or restrict a judge’s . . . method of communication but rather
addresses its substance.”). However, the Florida Advisory Committee did say that the substance of a
judge’s online postings can violate the code of conduct.
89. Id. (“Of course, the substance of what is posted may constitute a violation.”).
90. Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7, at 1 (2010).
91. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011).
92. Id.
93. The term “unofficial opinion” is my own. The unofficial opinions cited in this Note are an
article written by a Wisconsin judge and an article written by a lawyer on the Indiana state ethics
committee. Although these articles do not carry the same weight as official ethics opinions, they likely
reflect the way the state in question would decide the issue, as their authors are those one would
expect to know the answer to, or at least to have a very educated opinion about, the questions raised
by Opinion 66.
94. See Meiring, supra note 4, at 10 (“[J]udges generally can join internet social networks . . . . so
long as the activities do not otherwise violate the [Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct].”); Sankovitz,
supra note 4, at 11 (“Facebook and other online social networks are like social networks that are not
online . . . . [A] blanket ban on joining such groups has never been suggested.”).
95. S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009). This opinion
responded to a question from a magistrate judge, but there is little reason to think this distinction
makes a difference, as the opinion still cites the state’s judicial code of conduct.
96. Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 1 (2010). Note the actual question
answered by the Kentucky Ethics Committee was a compound question: “May a Kentucky judge or
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while the Kentucky Judicial Code of Conduct “was promulgated . . . long
before social networking sites” developed, judges have to maintain high
97
standards of conduct. The Kentucky Committee admitted it “struggled
98
with this issue” and almost answered a “Qualified No.” The tipping
point was that Kentucky judges are elected and should not be isolated
99
from their community. The Kentucky Ethics Committee, like the
California Committee but using less colorful language, specifically
advised that “pictures and commentary posted on sites which might be of
questionable taste, but otherwise acceptable for members of the general
100
public, may be inappropriate for judges.” The Kentucky committee
also advised that the judges be mindful of ex parte communications or
101
public comment.
B. May Judges “Friend” Lawyers Who Might Appear Before Them?
1. California
The second issue discussed by Opinion 66 was whether a judge may
include in her online social network a lawyer who might appear before
102
her. The opinion explained that while a judge should be careful to
avoid even the appearance of bias or undue influence, the judge also
103
should not be separated from the community in which she lives. It
added that judges may participate in associations to improve the law,
even ones that limit membership; online social networking should be the
104
same. In answering this question, the California Committee specified
that the principal issues were the ones relating to appearances, the
obligations to disclose the online relationship (and possible recusal), and
105
the danger of ex parte communications.
To deal with the issues relating to appearances, the California
Committee delineated four factors to determine whether the judge
“interacting with an attorney on a social networking site would create the
impression the attorney is in a special position to influence the judge and
justice, consistent with the code of judicial conduct, participate in an internet-based social networking
site, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace, or Twitter, and be ‘friends’ with various persons who appear
before the judge in court, such as attorneys, social workers, and/or law enforcement officials?” Id.
97. Id. at 1–2, 4–5.
98. Id. at 5.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 4 (citing In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 575 F.3d 279 (3d. Cir. 2009)). That
case, however, seems to express a somewhat extreme view. The material in question was sexually
explicit, something that would violate the terms of service of the social networking sites. In re
Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 575 F.3d 279, 283–84 (3d. Cir. 2009).
101. Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 4–5 (2010).
102. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 6 (2010).
103. Id. at 6–7.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 7, 10.
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cast doubt on the judge’s ability to be impartial.” The first factor is the
107
nature of the social networking site and the nature of the page. Thus, if
a judge used a page for primarily personal reasons, then an attorney
being “friends” with the judge might create the impression of bias, while
if a judge used the page to interact with groups like bar associations or
108
alumni groups, there would be no appearance of bias. The second
factor is the number of “friends” the judge has; a smaller number
109
supposedly creates the appearance of more influence. The third,
admittedly similar, factor is who the judge includes in her online social
network, again with more exclusivity meaning a higher chance of the
110
appearance of bias or influence. The fourth factor is how frequently the
attorney appears before the judge— the only factor requiring analysis of
facts other than those that can be gleaned from someone’s social
111
networking profile. As one may suspect, according to the Committee,
the more often the attorney appears before the judge, the greater the
112
appearance of bias or influence. Opinion 66 expanded on this last
factor by noting that an attorney perhaps should not be included at all in
a judge’s online social network if the relationship between the two would
113
already require disclosure.
The Committee went on to give an example of an unacceptable
social networking interaction and an example of an acceptable social
networking interaction, adding, “The closer a given situation comes to
one of these examples, the more likely it is that ‘friending’ an attorney is
114
either permissible or prohibited.”
In the hypothetical of an
impermissible interaction, the judge appeared to have a “personal” page
involving extrajudicial activities, and a former law school classmate
(“who is not a close friend”) who practiced in the judge’s jurisdiction
115
tried to add the judge as a friend. The permissible hypothetical
consisted of a judge who was a board member of a local bar association
and of the local Inns of Court and who merely wanted to update
participants about the activities of the two organizations or discuss issues

106. Id. at 8.
107. Id.
108. Id. This probably means that a site like LinkedIn, because of its professional nature, would
have a better chance of being acceptable than would a site like Facebook, but the California
Committee is not clear.
109. Id.
110. Id. The examples given are a judge being “friends” with a large number of prosecutors but not
defense attorneys, or a large number of plaintiff’s lawyers and no insurance defense counsel. The
important factor here is the appearance of bias or influence.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 8–9.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id.
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116

related to the legal community and profession. This judge also included
any lawyer who would like to be a part of his or her online social
117
network.
The California Committee next decided that disclosure is required if
118
an attorney is included in the online social network of a judge. It based
its decision on “the peculiar nature of online social networking sites”
because there may be evidence of the connection but not of the extent of
119
the connection. If the site is of a personal nature, but the judge allowed
the connection because it was unlikely the attorney was going to appear
before her, then the “judge should disqualify him or herself” if the
120
attorney does appear.
The final issue addressed in Opinion 66 was whether a judge may
121
include an attorney in her online social network. The opinion noted
that “the judge’s page will include posts the attorneys make on their
122
pages.” This may include acceptable public communications made by
123
the attorney that the judge should not see. The California Committee
was concerned that if attorney A is included in the judge’s online social
network, then the judge may see on Attorney A’s profile something
written by attorney B (an attorney appearing before the judge but not
included in the judge’s online social network), such as a Facebook
comment or tweet. Essentially, the committee was worried about
inadvertent ex parte communications online.
2. Other States
Most of the other states that released opinions believed it was
acceptable for a judge to include attorneys in her online social network,
although they did not discuss the matter in as much detail as did
California Opinion 66. The New York opinion commented that this
connection was “[i]n some ways . . . no different from adding the person’s
contact information into the judge’s Rolodex or address book or
124
The Kentucky Ethics
speaking to them in a public setting.”
Committee—the same committee that almost answered “no” as to
whether judges could participate in online social networks—said it best:
“While the nomenclature of a social networking site may designate
certain participants as ‘friends,’ . . . such a listing, by itself, does not
reasonably convey to others an impression that such persons are in a
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (noting that attorneys may discuss their cases more freely than may judges).
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009).
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special position to influence the judge.” The “intensity” of the
126
relationship is what matters, not the term itself. In fact, “[t]he
Committee conceives such terms as ‘friend,’ ‘fan’ and ‘follower’ to be
127
terms of art.”
This means, according to the Kentucky Ethics
Committee, judges must be mindful of whether their online connection,
128
combined with other factors, rises to the level forbidden by the code.
The Ohio opinion agreed, referring to the language in the Kentucky
129
opinion. It noted that “not all social relationships, online or otherwise,
130
require a judge’s disqualification.” The South Carolina Advisory
131
Committee’s opinion did not address the issue at all.
The unofficial opinions in Indiana and Wisconsin also did not take
issue with a judge including attorneys in her online social network. The
132
Indiana article stated that judges may “friend” attorneys.
The
Wisconsin article did not directly address this issue, but in criticizing the
Florida opinion (and agreeing with the Florida dissenters), it seemed to
hint that the author, a judge himself, thinks judges should be permitted
133
to include attorneys in online social networks.
134
Despite later criticisms and characterizations of it, the Florida
opinion never stated that judges should be forbidden from including
135
attorneys in their online social network. Instead, the opinion explicitly
limited judges to including attorneys not in the judge’s area or ones who
136
are already listed on the judge’s recusal list. This means that attorneys
who cannot appear before the judge or are very unlikely to appear

125. Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 2 (2010).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 3 (citing Ky. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E(1)).
129. Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7, at 5 (2010).
130. Id. at 9.
131. The South Carolina opinion answered only the question of whether a magistrate judge may be
a member of Facebook, doing so in the context of a judge who specifically asked about the possible
impropriety of being Facebook friends “with several law enforcement officers and employees of the
Magistrate’s office.” S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009).
132. Meiring, supra note 4, at 10.
133. Sankovitz, supra note 4, at 10.
134. See, e.g., John Schwartz, For Judges on Facebook, Friendship Has Limits, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10,
2009, at A25 (“Judges and lawyers in Florida can no longer be Facebook friends.”); Barb Dybwad,
Florida to Judges: Don’t Facebook Friend Lawyers, Mashable (Dec. 10, 2009), http://mashable.com/
2009/12/10/florida-bans-lawyer-friends/ (analyzing the opinion and noting that the opinion is not a
complete bar to lawyers and judges being Facebook friends); Violet Petran, Judges and Lawyers Are
Not Facebook Friends, LegalMatch (Jan. 11, 2010), http://lawblog.legalmatch.com/2010/01/11/judgesand-lawyers-are-not-facebook-friends/ (“Recently, a Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee
opines on ethical issues relating to judges’ use of social networking sites like Facebook. The
verdict . . . judges may not be ‘friends’ (cyber speaking that is) with lawyers.”).
135. Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009).
136. Id. Interestingly, the opinion speaks of these issues in reference to Facebook but then goes on
to state that the same conclusions apply to all other social networking sites that allow others, whether
or not they are a part of the network, to see who the judge has included in her online social network. Id.
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(because they are based in another state, for example) before the judge
can be included. The Florida opinion, however, later explained that
including attorneys who are likely to appear would violate the Florida
137
Code of Judicial Conduct. A minority of the ethics commission
disagreed, reasoning that the connection between judges and attorneys
138
may be described differently online.
The Oklahoma opinion agreed with Florida’s majority opinion,
139
noting connections were permissible but only in limited circumstances.
Specifically, the Oklahoma Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel declared that
a judge may have a social networking account, but limited the
permissible connections to persons who do not regularly appear or who
140
are unlikely to appear before the judge. This limitation includes not
only attorneys but also social workers, law enforcement officers, and
“others who regularly appear in court in an adversarial role,” which
141
presumably extends to expert witnesses. It also admonished that “social
142
networking sites are fraught with peril for Judges.”
C. May Judges Be “Friends” with Lawyers Who Are Appearing
Before Them?
The states’ judicial ethics opinions differed most on the issue of
whether a judge may be “friends” with an attorney appearing before her.
The advisory committees of the states recommended either that a judge
should not include attorneys appearing before her in her online social
network, or that the judge should be allowed to, subject to limitations.
143
South Carolina did not address this question.
1. California
The California Committee answered this question with a decisive
144
“no.” It said that if an attorney appears before a judge, the judge
should immediately cease contact on the social networking site to avoid
145
any possible appearance of bias. This is to be done regardless of which
146
social networking site the judge and attorney are using. The Committee
did not factor the nature of the social networking site into its analysis
137. Id.
138. Id. (“[S]ocial networking sites have become so ubiquitous that the term ‘friend’ on these
pages does not convey the same meaning that it did in the pre-internet age . . . .”).
139. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009). Again, the
opinion concerned the inclusion of law enforcement officers in the online social network of a judge.
144. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 11 (2010).
145. Id. at 10–11 (“[T]he attorney should be unfriended.”).
146. Id. at 11.
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because it reasoned that continuing contact of any kind creates the
impression “that the attorney is in a special position to influence the
judge simply by virtue of the ready access afforded by the social
147
networking site.”
2. Other States
All of the other states’ advisory opinions, besides Florida’s, found
that a judge may be “friends” with an attorney while the attorney is
appearing before the judge, subject to some limitations. The New York
opinion warned judges that an online connection, alone or combined
148
with other factors, can rise to a level that requires disclosure or recusal.
Kentucky, as mentioned, also warned judges to be mindful of the
149
strength of the connection. The Ohio opinion had similar sentiments,
noting that the nature of the relationship (more than just being a
“friend”) is the important factor, though “not all social relationships,
150
online, or otherwise, require a judge’s disqualification.”
The unofficial opinions from Indiana and Wisconsin were split on
the question of whether a judge should be allowed to be “friends” online
with attorneys appearing before the judge. The counsel for the Indiana
commission had the most nuanced approach, recommending a judge
eliminate connections with attorneys on MySpace and Facebook but
151
seeing no issue with LinkedIn. Like the California opinion, there was a
concern about appearance issues, although Indiana only recommended
152
(but did not require) that the connection cease. The Wisconsin judge
seemed to believe that there would be no issue unless there was a close
friendship that required recusal, as an online connection is just a
153
different way to network.
Like the California Committee, the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory
Committee and the Oklahoma Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel advised
that a judge not include attorneys who are appearing before her in her
154
online social network. In Opinion 09-20, the Florida committee stated
that it believed such a connection is improper because it creates an
147. Id.
148. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009).
149. Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 3 (2010).
150. Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7, at 9 (2010).
151. Meiring, supra note 4, at 10–11 (discussing how the chance of receiving ex parte
communications is lower on LinkedIn and how being in the same LinkedIn network is more like being
in the same bar or alumni association than like being social friends). However, the author of the
Indiana opinion may change her approach now that users of LinkedIn have “the ability to post daily
musings.” Id. at 11.
152. Id. at 10 (“To avoid issues, the judge may want to remove the attorney . . . as a ‘friend’ from
his Facebook or MySpace list until the case is over.”).
153. Sankovitz, supra note 4, at 11.
154. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011); Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009).
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155

appearance of bias. It emphasized that it is the appearance of influence
that is important—the mere act of identifying a lawyer as a social
networking friend is the violation of the code—not whether there is any
156
chance of influence. A minority of the Florida committee disagreed,
157
noting the mere act does not create the appearance of bias.
In a second opinion, the Florida committee reaffirmed Opinion 09158
20, again with a minority disagreeing. The minority opined that because
social networking sites are growing so quickly, members of the public
would not immediately think there is an appearance of influence when
an attorney is a member of a judge’s online social network because they
159
know it may mean the two are merely acquainted. The minority added
that even if the term “friend” were accepted as referring to actual
friendship, additional facts are required before recusal because being
160
actual friends does not even require disclosure in many instances. The
majority, however, reiterated its belief that online connections are
impermissible because the “unique medium in which internet social
networking sites permit the networking and sharing of personal
information and experiences among a select and exclusive community”
161
creates the appearance that the attorney is in a position of influence.
However, the Florida committee unanimously declared that if there is an
appearance of bias, a judge cannot cure it by adding a disclaimer saying
he or she will accept as a friend any user with a recognized name or with
162
common “friends.” This was never suggested by any of the other
opinions, likely because they are less restrictive.
The Oklahoma opinion was brief but very similar to Florida’s
163
Opinion 09-20. It explicitly agreed with Florida’s opinion that a judge
would violate ethical rules by including lawyers who appear before her in
164
her online social network. The Oklahoma panel emphasized that the
appearance of influence was the critical feature that makes such a
connection improper, and offered the following reasoning: “We believe

155. Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2010-06 (2010) (“A majority of this
Committee continues to believe that Fla. JEAC Op. 09-20 was correctly decided and that judges
should not accept requests from lawyers who appear before them to be recognized as their ‘friends’ or
contacts on social networking sites.” (emphasis added)). The minority opinion here, however, was
much more thorough and in-depth than was the previous opinion. Additionally, this opinion included
a number of case citations, unlike the previous opinion. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing cases and prior opinions including one in which a twenty-eight year relationship did
not necessarily require recusal, and one in which a weekly tennis match did not even require disclosure).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011).
164. Id.
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that public trust in the impartiality and fairness of the judicial system is
so important that is imperative to err on the side of caution where the
165
situation is ‘fraught with peril.’” Perhaps this is why it suggested the
strictest guidelines of all of the opinions, extending the prohibition
beyond attorneys to any person who regularly appears in the judge’s
166
court—not even necessarily before the judge. The Oklahoma panel
also (oddly) quoted the Kentucky opinion in saying that a judge must
freely accept restrictions on conduct that may be burdensome to an
167
ordinary citizen.
D. General Concerns of the Advisory Opinions
These state advisory opinions also contained several other concerns
168
relating to the use of social networking sites. The California opinion
concluded by saying it had not enacted a per se ban on interactions with
169
attorneys who might appear before judges. It added some general
advice about checking privacy settings and ended with a statement
expressing that “notwithstanding the explosion of participation in online
social networking sites, judges should carefully weigh whether the benefit
170
of their participation is worth all the attendant risks.”
Other opinions noted that “[t]here is something about the ease of
communication [on social networking sites] that may just make it too
171
easy for a judge to slip.” All of the opinions had similar concerns. New
York was clear to remind judges that giving legal advice or discussing a
172
case would be impermissible. The Kentucky ethics committee echoed
these concerns, and it was particularly concerned with ex parte
communications, noting that a North Carolina judge had been publically
173
reprimanded for communicating with an attorney. It warned judges to

165. Id.
166. Id. The opinion, however, explicitly noted that the judge may be connected to court staff. Id.
167. Id. (quoting Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 4 (2010)). It is odd
because the Kentucky opinion—which was quoting the commentary to Canon 2A of the Kentucky
Code of Judicial Conduct—allowed a judge to use online social networking. Ethics Comm. of the Ky.
Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 1, 4 (2010). The context of this quote in the Kentucky opinion,
however, was noting the limits of the use of online social networking (especially not posting
inappropriate pictures or commentary), not forbidding the use of the sites. Id. at 4.
168. These concerns, while not precisely pertinent to this Note, provide essential information for a
judge who is considering whether she wants to use, or continue to use, any social networking site.
169. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 11 (2010).
170. Id. at 11–12.
171. Allison Petty, Social Networking Web Sites Raise Ethical Issues for Judges, Lawyers,
AllBusiness (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/trial-procedure-judges/13862837.html
(quoting Cynthia Gray, director of the American Judicature Society Center for Judicial Ethics, who
was speaking only about Facebook).
172. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009).
173. Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 4–5 (2010) (citing Public
Reprimand of B. Carlton Terry Jr., N.C. Judicial Standards Comm’n Inquiry No. 08-234 (2009)).
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be “extremely cautious” on social networking sites. The Oklahoma
175
opinion similarly suggested caution.
The Ohio opinion provided
guidelines for using social networking sites, including (in addition to
similar ones mentioned by other states): (1) judges must maintain dignity
in photographs, (2) judges “must not foster . . . interactions . . . if [they]
will erode confidence in the independence of judicial decision making,”
(3) judges must not use social networking sites to do outside research,
and (4) judges should “be aware of the contents of [their] social
networking page, be familiar with the social networking site policies and
privacy controls, and be prudent in all interactions on a social networking
176
177
site.” The unofficial opinion in Indiana had similar concerns. The
Wisconsin article did not address these specific issues.

III. California Opinion 66 Is Flawed
As a matter of law and as a matter of policy, Opinion 66 partially
missed the mark. Despite using the appropriate canons, the understanding
of social networking sites displayed by the California Committee led to
flawed results from a legal perspective. The Committee also failed to
consider a number of policy issues, especially that California judges are
elected. To the credit of the Committee, it recognized that Opinion 66
“promises to be the first of many to address this issue” of ethical
constraints that arise when a judge participates in online social
178
networking in California. Another opinion is necessary to correct the
errors in Opinion 66. Hopefully, the California Committee will take
appropriate action.
A. Opinion 66 Is Flawed from a Legal Perspective
The canons of the California Code of Judicial Ethics establish
179
standards for actions of judges on and off the bench. Other relevant
statutory sources of law in California are sections 170.1 and 170.6 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, which contain the grounds for
180
voluntary and involuntary disqualification, respectively. In addition,
retired judge David Rothman’s California Judicial Conduct Handbook—
a book that “attempt[s] to integrate all available materials on judicial
181
ethics in California”—provides guidance for judges. It is important to

174. Id. at 5.
175. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011).
176. Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7, at 7–9 (2010).
177. Meiring, supra note 4, at 10–11 (discussing how ex parte information may be inadvertently
received and how legal advice may be solicited).
178. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 1 (2010).
179. Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics pmbl. (2009).
180. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 170.1, 170.6 (2010).
181. Rothman, supra note 12, § 1.00.
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note that in California, advisory opinions about judicial ethics can
182
become “authoritative.” Opinion 66, however, should not.
The California Committee was concerned about the risk of an
apparent connection between an attorney and a judge on an online social
183
network indicating bias or influence. The Committee believed this issue
was largest during trial (or appeal), thus its declaration that a judge
should not include an attorney in her online social network during that
184
period. This conclusion is based on a partially flawed view of online
social networking. Opinion 66 correctly noted that, under specific
circumstances, merely because an attorney is “friends” with a judge does
185
not mean the attorney is in a special position to influence the judge. It
also set out four important factors as part of the test to determine
186
whether there is a possible appearance of impropriety. Despite this
test, the Committee concluded that if a judge and an attorney are
connected on a social networking site, then the judge is always
disqualified because of an appearance of impropriety unless the judge
187
“unfriends” the attorney and discloses the online connection. Opinion
66 reached this conclusion without referring to the test it advanced. The
opinion did say that even if a judge makes a disclosure regarding the
connection, the judge still must cease online contact so as to avoid the
188
appearance of bias or influence.
The California Committee should have recognized that an online
connection between an attorney and a judge while a case is pending does
not warrant recusal under the California Code of Civil Procedure,
especially if it does not rise to the level of special influence. The test
under the Code to determine whether a trial judge must be recused is
whether “[a] person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a
189
doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.” Additionally,
Judge Rothman noted:

182. See Ethics Committee Advisory Opinions, Cal. Judges Ass’n, http://www.caljudges.org/
ethics_opinions.vp.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (declaring that some opinions are authoritative,
others are no longer applicable, and that others have no comment or distinguishing characteristics).
Recall that the opinions, while not technically binding, are relied on by the California Commission on
Judicial Performance and the California Supreme Court.
183. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 7–10 (2010).
184. Id. at 10–11.
185. Id. at 7.
186. Id. at 8.
187. Id. at 10–11.
188. Id. at 11.
189. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.1 (a)(6)(A)(iii) (2010) (emphasis added). If an attorney believes
there is actual prejudice, she can file a peremptory challenge under section 170.6, which requires an
affidavit under penalty of perjury stating that the judge is prejudiced. Id. § 170.6(2). Based only on
online social networking contact, such a motion would likely fail.
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The test for disclosure and disqualification in social friendships is
similar to that which one might employ with respect to a dating
relationship: is the relationship that of a mere “acquaintance,” in which
case even disclosure is questionable, or is the person within the inner
circle of the judge’s intimate friends, such that disqualification is
required? Between these extremes are the variables, where the
relationship gradation moves closer to clear disclosure and then to
clear disqualification. The circumstances might also be such that,
whereas the judge might not even consider disclosure of an
acquaintanceship with an attorney appearing in court to represent a
client, the judge might recuse where the attorney is personally a party
190
in the case.

Online social networks are an indication of social friendships, social
acquaintances, and professional connections. The relationship between a
judge and an attorney can be examined by looking at their connection
and interaction with one another on the particular website. As noted,
being online “friends” with a judge does not necessarily mean one has
special access to a judge. Furthermore, attorneys should trust that a
judge would disclose any improper communication between her and
opposing counsel during trial (something which may alter the
191
situation). As the actual relationships that a judge has with “friends” in
her online social network may vary, a social networking connection by
itself should not raise an improper appearance issue. The opinions in
192
Kentucky, New York, and Ohio recognized this fact.
As mentioned, the California Committee seemed to misinterpret the
test for recusal provided by the California Code of Civil Procedure, or its
application, because of a flawed view of social networking sites. The
Committee’s interpretation is far too strict, as “a person aware of the
facts” would understand the relationship that online “friends” have with
one another—namely that a person who understands the facts would not
think the connection by itself means the judge cannot be impartial. This
lack of understanding is typified by the first example it gave after it
described the four-factor test to determine whether “friending” is
193
permissible. In the hypothetical, a former classmate, not a close friend,
194
requested to be included in the judge’s online social network. The
judge in this situation had a “personal” page and only a small number of
190. Rothman, supra note 12, § 7.51, at 356–57 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing Cal.
Judges Ass’n, Formal Ethics Op. 45, at 4 (1997)).
191. The judge likely would be required to disclose this communication, depending on the
circumstances, the nature of the communication, and other factors. If, for example, it was a
“professional” connection, there would be no reason for an attorney to believe there were some kind
of special access the judge would not disclose. Any communication would be like any other ex parte
communication. If the communication were related to a professional meeting, such as a bar association
or alumni meeting, it would not even need to be disclosed.
192. See supra notes 124–33, 148–53 and accompanying text.
193. See Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 9 (2010).
194. Id.
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195

“friends,” including a few colleagues. The California Committee
196
believed this would not be an acceptable interaction. Unfortunately,
the Committee did not give enough information for its own test (for
instance, the judge’s practice for determining who to include was not part
of the test at all—if the judge had a brand new profile, the lawyer’s
request might be the first from someone who was not a close friend or
colleague). Regardless, the California Committee did not seem to
understand the purpose of social networking sites: to connect or
reconnect with people you know. In addition, the law regarding recusal
and disclosure circumstances must be taken into account; a person aware
of all the facts would still examine the actual relationship and conclude
that there is no reason a distant classmate would receive preferential
197
treatment.
198
Ex parte communications also worried the California Committee.
In general, under Canon 3B(7) of the California Code of Judicial Ethics,
a judge must disclose all ex parte communications received from an
199
attorney in a case over which the judge is presiding. An improper ex
parte communication can result in disqualification of the judge: Any such
200
communication violates Canon 3B(7) even if it is not prejudicial. If the
communication was inadvertent, then the judge must disclose it, but the
201
judge does not have to recuse herself unless she cannot be impartial.
The possibility of ex parte communication may be greater on an online
202
social network because of the public nature of many comments on the
203
sites. This does not mean, however, that a judge should avoid using
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.1 (a)(6)(A)(iii) (2010). Of course, this assumes the judge has no
history of giving preferential treatment to prior classmates, something that is very easy to assume
because of the high level of professionalism required of judges.
198. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 10 (2010).
199. Cal. Code. of Judicial Ethics Canon 3B(7) (2009); Rothman, supra note 12, § 5.23, at 220.
Note that this assumes the ex parte communication is improper: “A judge may initiate or consider any
ex parte communication when expressly authorized by law to do so.” Cal. Code. of Judicial Ethics
Canon 3B(7)(e) (2009). For example, under California Penal Code section 987.9, a judge (who is not
the trial judge) must communicate ex parte with experts, investigators, and others while considering a
ruling on a motion for ancillary services to assist an indigent defendant in a death penalty case. See
Cal. Pen. Code § 987.9 (2010); see also 6 B.E. Witkin, California Procedure §§ 58–62 (5th ed. 2008)
(noting portions of the law regarding permissible ex parte communications in civil cases).
200. Rothman, supra note 12, § 5.00, at 195.
201. See Judicial Ethics Update, Cal. Judges Ass’n (Apr. 2000), http://www.caljudges.org/
ethics_updates_update1999.vp.html.
202. These communications can, of course, come from a judge, too. See Petty, supra note 171
(“There is something, apparently, about technology that encourages people to do things that they
might not otherwise do . . . .” (quoting Cynthia Gray, director of the American Judicature Society
Center for Judicial Ethics)).
203. By public nature, I mean that unless the judge or attorney explicitly limits what the other can
see (an action possible only on Facebook so far) then once the two are connected, everything one
posts can be seen by the other.
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online social networking because of the possibility of ex parte
communications: There is a duty to disclose ex parte communications,
not a duty to avoid situations in which they may occur. The canons
regarding ex parte communications never mention that a judge must
204
avoid such potential situations. In fact, the opposite is true: Judges
205
should interact with the community.
Opinion 66 also discusses the apparent bias that may result from
206
postings on a judge’s profile page by other users. The Committee stated
207
that judges should be responsible for removing certain postings.
However, it is not legally sound to mandate or suggest that “a judge has
an obligation to be vigilant” and check frequently to see if anyone posted
208
a comment that may be offensive. First, despite what the California
Committee believed, comments on the judge’s page do not create an
209
impression that the judge has adopted them. There must be a “public
manifestation . . . of the judge’s knowing approval of invidious
discrimination” for “adoption” of a comment to violate the California
210
Code of Judicial Ethics. Without more than the mere appearance of a
post on a wall, it cannot be said the judge knowingly approved of the
post. To conclude otherwise would be similar to saying that a person
adopts all of his or her received emails (which may even include spam),
211
assuming the emails were made public. It may be better if the judge
disclaims comments, especially particularly offensive comments or posts,
but this cannot be a requirement. Second, Canon 3A of the California
Code of Judicial Ethics requires that “judicial duties prescribed by law
212
shall take precedence over all other activities.” Requiring a judge to be
“vigilant” implies that a judge needs to check frequently to possibly

204. See Rothman, supra note 12, § 5.00, at 195.
205. Id. § 10.00.
206. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 5 (2010).
207. Id.
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. This is true for the most part, though there may be times where it is apparent that the judge
approves (for example, the judge comments on the post, likes the post, reposts or retweets the same
thing, and so forth). The South Dakota Supreme Court noted this issue in Onnen v. Sioux Falls
Independent School District No. 49-5, although the Facebook post at issue in that case was a “Happy
Birthday” post written on the judge’s wall in Czech by a testifying witness. 801 N.W.2d 752, 757 (S.D.
2011).
210. Cal. Code. of Judicial Ethics Canon 2C cmt. (2009). This is, however, still being discussed
and is not yet “fully answered.” See Rachel M. Zahorsky, Panelists: Judges Should Watch Whom They
“Friend” on Social Media and What Friends Post About Them, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 6, 2011, 5:04 PM)
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judges_should_watch_who_they_friend_on_social_media_and
_what_friends_family/ (“One question that was not fully answered by the panel . . . was the extent of
the judiciary’s responsibility to monitor the activities of friends and family members who might include
a judge’s likeness or appear to represent a jurist’s opinion or affiliation.”).
211. A distinction, of course, can be made between the two because of the public nature of social
networking sites, even though access can be limited to a degree.
212. Cal. Code. of Judicial Ethics Canon 3A (2009) (footnote omitted).
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remove offending posts. However, judges should not be expected to
constantly spend time monitoring all of their online social networking
profiles, which would detract from their duties. This requirement would
leave them unable to have such profiles at all.
Opinion 66 treated social networking technology in a special
manner, in a way that has no basis in the relevant law. There is not a
single canon or statute relating to judicial ethics, nor a relevant case, that
213
mentions online social networking or that says that a judge using social
networking sites makes the situation different or creates a different test
214
for recusal. Be that as it may, it is true that new technology does change
some things when it comes to a judge’s daily activities and judicial
215
ethics. Many of these changes, as will be explained, are for the better.
B. Opinion 66 Is Flawed from a Policy Perspective
As a matter of policy, Opinion 66 does not make sense, especially
with respect to its requirement a judge cease contact on online social
networks while a case is before her. This requirement may lessen the
chance of an attorney or party discovering an improper relationship. In
addition, because California judges are elected, they may be hesitant to

213. Occasionally, a disciplinary action involves online social networks but does not comment on
any specific aspects; it merely mentions how social networking led to the improper behavior. See, e.g.,
Public Reprimand of B. Carlton Terry Jr., N.C. Judicial Standards Comm’n Inquiry No. 08-234 (2009)
(reprimanding a judge for an ex parte communication on Facebook).
214. Indeed, the South Dakota Supreme Court expressly noted that a Facebook post by a
testifying witness wishing a judge “Happy Birthday” is not an ex parte communication because it does
not concern the proceeding—thus, it is acceptable. Onnen, 801 N.W.2d at 757–58. The court went on
to hold that even if the post was an ex parte communication, it was uninvited, not related to the case,
and did not affect the decision because the judge was not even aware it had occurred. Id. at 758. More
important, the “post did not relate to any facts regarding the case and certainly not to any facts [the
plaintiff] would need to rebut.” Id. While this case involved a witness and not an attorney, the
outcome likely would not have been different had an attorney made the post.
215. Everyone knows how much easier it is to find information now with a connection to the
Internet. Judges must resist the temptation to research on the Internet, as they have a duty to consider
only what is before them before. See Judicial Ethics Update, Cal. Judges Ass’n (Mar. 2005),
http://www.caljudges.org/ethics_october_2004_ethics_update.vp.html (“A judge should not use the
internet to research the validity of facts presented in court proceedings.”). But see A.B. v. State, 885
N.E.2d 1223, 1224 (Ind. 2008) (“The Commentary to Canon 3B of the Indiana Code of Judicial
Conduct advises: ‘A judge must not independently investigate facts in a case and must consider only
the evidence presented.’ Notwithstanding this directive, in order to facilitate understanding of the facts
and application of relevant legal principles, this opinion includes information regarding the operation
and use of MySpace from identified sources outside the trial record of this case.” (emphasis added)).
Also, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts—who is not bound by any code of conduct—did
online research before deciding Arizona Free Enterprise Fund v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), and
McCormish v. Bennett, 130 S. Ct. 1498 (2010) (mem.). See Ira Pilchen, Social Media Has Benefits and
Pitfalls for Courts, Panelists Say, ABANOW (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.abanow.org/2011/08/
social-media-has-benefits-and-pitfalls-for-courts-panelists-say/ (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’
comments during oral arguments and noting a that district court judge questioned Chief Justice Roberts’
actions).
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remove attorneys from an online social network and risk losing their
political support.
The most concerning policy implication of Opinion 66 is that judges
cannot engage in what is becoming normal behavior: using online social
216
networks. It is true, as the California Code of Judicial Ethics provides,
that to avoid irresponsible or improper conduct, “[a] judge
must . . . accept restrictions on the judge’s conduct that might be viewed
as burdensome by other members of the community and should do so
217
freely and willingly.” Yet a judge can likely use social networking sites
while still avoiding both irresponsible and improper conduct. This is true
even when an attorney in the judge’s online social network appears in
218
her court. If judges are restricted from using the sites, there may be an
unfortunate situation similar to what occurred in Florida: judges
removing a number of their “friends” or even shutting down their social
219
networking accounts completely.
Opinion 66 also recommended that judges disclose online social
networking contact with attorneys, especially if one of the attorneys
220
appears in the judge’s court. Although the idea makes sense, the
Committee’s belief that the nature of the online connection requires
221
automatic disclosure is misguided. It seems this conclusion is due to
some idea of special access or contact with the judge. Yet often judges’
official email addresses, phone numbers, and mailing addresses are
222
extremely easy to discover, so contacting a judge is not difficult. An
attorney may already have the judge’s email address. The analysis must
turn on the nature of the relationship, not on the possibility of contact.
216. LaRoe, supra note 9 (“[Judge Grewal of the Northern District of California] is among a class
of younger judges adamant about keeping their social networks going despite the tightrope they must
walk.”).
217. Cal. Code. of Judicial Ethics Canon 2A cmt. (2009). But “[t]he Commentary does not
constitute additional rules and should not be so construed.” Id. at pmbl.
218. This seems like a bold assertion, but it has to be true. As mentioned, around 40% of judges
are using social networking sites and the number of cases in which a judge has been disciplined is
extremely small. The only public reprimand so far is of Judge B. Carlton Terry, Jr., in North Carolina.
See Public Reprimand of B. Carlton Terry Jr., N.C. Judicial Standards Comm’n Inquiry No. 08-234
(2009). In addition, there was a judge in Georgia who resigned after questions arose about his contact
with a defendant, including “Facebook e-mails” that detailed the relationship between the two. Debra
Cassens Weiss, Ga. Judge Resigns After Questions Raised About Facebook Contacts, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 7,
2010, 10:44 AM) http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ga._judge_resigns_after_questions_raised_
about_facebook_contacts/.
219. Sarah Lundy, Judges Find Facebook Can Be a Lonely Place, Orlando Sentinel (Jan. 1, 2010),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-01-01/news/0912310148_1_facebook-friends-judges-questionsocial networking-site (discussing the reactions of judges in Florida to its advisory opinion).
220. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 10–11 (2010).
221. Id. at 11.
222. Judges’ email addresses are frequently some combination of the judge’s first name, or first
initial, and their last name plus the court’s domain name. For example: “JMarshall@SupremeCourt.org”
or “JohnMarshall@SupremeCourt.org.” These domain names are not hard to discover because usually
there will be at least one email address listed on the court’s website that uses the domain name.
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The law does not require a judge to disclose all social contact, and from
a policy perspective, disclosure should be up to the judge. Furthermore,
courts are busy and congested. As such, it makes more sense to trust
224
judges to act properly and disclose connections that may be an issue.
Without such trust, an unworkable system would result, one with
frequent recusals, causing cases to shift from one judge to another. Most
judges know that if the situation calls for disclosure or recusal, they have
the discretion to analyze the situation and act as they deem
225
appropriate. This does not mean that a judge will never have to
disclose an online contact—sometimes the judge may feel it is
appropriate to do so. An automatic disclosure of all contacts, however, is
far too burdensome.
It may be an even better policy to encourage a judge to include an
attorney in her online social network, as this might help attorneys and
judges adhere to their respective codes of conduct. A judge has a duty to
“take appropriate corrective action” if the judge has “personal
knowledge” that an attorney has violated any provisions of the Rules of
226
Professional Conduct. In Texas, which has a similar rule, a judge did
just that: Judge Susan Criss denied a continuance to an attorney who had
posted several updates about drinking and partying during the week, but
when appearing before Judge Criss, asked for a continuance because of
227
the death of her father. An attorney may, of course, be wary of
228
connecting with a judge. It is not, and should not, be a requirement that
an attorney include a judge in the attorney’s online social network. In
addition, a judge should not have to police the attorneys who appear
before them, but if an attorney and judge become “friends,” then such
223. See supra Part III.A.
224. But see Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 Hastings L.J. 657, 670 (2005)
(“[T]he judge’s belief that she is not biased is not conclusive, and indeed, is irrelevant.”).
225. Judges even have a checklist to help them. See Rothman, supra note 12, at app. F (giving trial
judges a six-step checklist for determining whether recusal or disclosure is appropriate and what to do
if either is appropriate).
226. Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3D(2) (2009). California law also “imposes additional
reporting requirements regarding lawyers.” See id. at Canon 3D cmt.
227. Molly McDonough, Facebooking Judge Catches Lawyer in Lie, Sees Ethical Breaches,
A.B.A. J. (July 31, 2009, 2:16 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/facebooking_judge_
catches_lawyers_in_lies_crossing_ethical_lines_abachicago/.
228. Alex Ginsberg, SI Judge Is Red “Face”d, N.Y. Post (Oct. 15, 2009, 10:44 AM),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/staten_island/item_1TCZaxBoS2p5oOyES11jPN (“[Receiving a
friend request from a judge] puts the lawyer in a very uncomfortable position. If you say no, and then
you have to appear before him and ask for bail. And if you say yes, that’s also awkward.”); Petty,
supra note 171 (“I don’t know if I necessarily would want the judges to be aware of what’s going on in
my personal life . . . .” (quoting Christopher J. McGeehan, a partner in a technology law firm)); cf.
Paul B. Kennedy, Can’t We All Just Be Friends?, Def. Rests (Feb. 10, 2011), http://kennedylaw.blogspot.com/2011/02/cant-we-all-just-be-friends.html (“Judge Susan Criss in Galveston [Texas]
and I are ‘friends’ on Facebook. I practice in her court. I have no special privileges when I set foot in
her courtroom. Judge Criss posts pictures of the sun setting over the island and of her dogs chewing up
her slippers. It’s funny.”).
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policing is possible. An online connection may cause an attorney at least
to pause before posting a potentially violative statement on a social
networking site. Social networking may improve judicial ethics, as well,
because a judge has a similar duty to initiate corrective action if she has
“reliable information” that another judge has violated the California
229
Code of Judicial Ethics.
Another important policy consideration relates to judicial elections
in particular: An elected judge should be able to include attorneys in her
230
online social network. This should be allowed regardless of the chance
of an attorney appearing before the judge. In California, judges are
elected (in an initial election or approval of appointment, a reelection, or
231
a “confirmation” election). A California judge may receive a donation
for an election from an attorney and still hear a case involving that
232
attorney, which arguably would make a judge appear more biased than
would having an online connection with the attorney. Judges in some
233
states use or create their social networking profile during elections
234
because it is an effective way to connect with attorneys. While it is true
that on Facebook a judge may be able to make a public profile or “fan”
235
page, this is not true for other social networking sites, nor is it practical
for some judges to do. For example, a judge may already have a number
of Facebook friends who are attorneys and creating a fan page does not
ensure the attorneys will all become “fans” of the judge.
As for attorneys appearing before the judge, if the judge had to
remove each one from her list of online “friends” before trial, not only is
there no guarantee that the attorney would rejoin the judge’s online
social network, there is even the danger of the appearance of bias. This
may occur when the judge or attorney “friends” the other after the trial.
The appearance of bias may also go the other way (that is, the judge may
229. Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3D(1) (2009).
230. Because Opinion 66 did not address the question, this Note is not directly discussing any
ethical issues relating to social networking sites and judicial elections.
231. 2 B.E. Witkin Legal Inst., supra note 199, §§ 2–3.
232. Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 5A cmt. (2009) (“In judicial elections, judges are
neither required to shield themselves from campaign contributions nor are they prohibited from
soliciting contributions from anyone including attorneys. Nevertheless, there are necessary limits on
judges facing election if the appearance of impropriety is to be avoided. Although it is improper for a
judge to receive a gift from an attorney subject to exceptions noted in Canon 4D(6), a judge’s
campaign may receive attorney contributions.”)
233. See Petty, supra note 171 (discussing the use of Facebook by Judge William H. Hooks for his
election campaign); Editorial: Facebook Requires Judges’ Caution, News Herald (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://www.news-herald.com/articles/2010/12/13/opinion/nh3400373.txt?viewmode=fullstory
(discussing Judge Eugene A. Lucci’s use of Facebook during his election and mentioning that several
judges created new profiles during the election cycle).
234. See, e.g., Christie L. Smith, Newsflash . . . Social Media, Texas Ctr. for the Judiciary,
http://www.yourhonor.com/SocialMediaPartOne.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (noting the use of
Facebook and LinkedIn by a judge elected to the bench).
235. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
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appear to be biased against the attorney because she “unfriended” the
attorney). Opinion 66 recommended disclosure when a judge has
included an attorney in her online social network because of a belief that
236
the attorney was not going to appear before the judge, but somehow did.
Another extremely important policy issue relating to Opinion 66 is
transparency. Even if a judge decides not to use social networking sites,
contact with the judge’s close friends will still take place. By allowing, or
encouraging, judges to use social networking sites, these relationships
become more transparent. Although this Note advocates that judges
should be trusted, there are times where the judge may simply forget to
disclose that she went to high school, college, or law school with an
attorney appearing before her or may believe wholeheartedly that
disclosure is unnecessary because she will not act in a biased fashion.
When the contact occurs online, especially if opposing counsel “friends”
the judge, then the entire process will be more transparent. The
Facebook “friendship page” would particularly help with transparency
because it is an amalgamation of the contact between a judge and an
attorney.
Furthermore, online social networking allows the judge to reach a
broader audience so the judge can help educate the public about the
237
law. Judges, subject to some restraints, should not be separated from
the community in which they live: “Complete separation of a judge from
extrajudicial activities is neither possible nor wise; a judge should not
238
become isolated from the community in which the judge lives.” Online
social networking, with its widespread use, is almost certain to be a part
of a judge’s community. Isolation from that avenue of communication is
not wise and may hinder the judge’s duty to, among other things, act as a
leader in the community, promote understanding of and confidence in
239
the administration of justice, and help the public understand the courts.
C. The California Judicial Ethics Committee Did Not Get
Everything Wrong
Despite its flaws, Opinion 66 had a number of valid points. It is
relatively uncontroversial for judges to use social networking sites,
240
something the opinion noted. In addition, the opinion listed a number
236. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 10 (2010).
237. Rothman, supra note 12, § 10.00, at 522 (“[A] judge has a duty to help educate the public.”).
238. Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4A cmt. (2009).
239. Cal. R. Court 10.5 (2007) (describing the role of the judiciary in the community); see also
Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4B cmt. (“As a judicial officer and person specially learned in
the law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system,
and the administration of justice . . . .”).
240. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 3–4 (2010). Indeed, all of the
advisory opinions that have been released allow a judge to use social networking sites, albeit with
different limitations. See supra Part II.B.
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of important ethical considerations for judges to consider while using
241
online social networking. The opinion also reminded judges to be
aware of privacy settings on social networking sites—both for ethics242
related and non ethics-related reasons. It closed with a reminder
unrelated to ethics but important for all judges, maybe even all people,
using social networking sites: Be mindful of security because “[i]t is
frightening how much someone can learn about another person from a
243
few Internet searches.”

IV. What the California Judicial Ethics Committee
Should Propose
Since Opinion 66 is not yet authoritative according to the California
Committee, it can release a new opinion correcting itself. The California
Committee should propose a more nuanced approach to dealing with
issues that arise out of online social networking. It must recognize that
many people who will become judges are already using social networking
sites and it must consider in more depth what judges can do online.
Imagine the following situation: An assistant district attorney, one
who has been working for fifteen years in criminal law, is appointed to be
a judge. While in law school, the attorney added or accepted some fellow
law students as Facebook friends. Since becoming a district attorney,
however, most of her Facebook friends who are lawyers are ones with
whom she works. Furthermore, she frequently spends time with these
fellow district attorneys, so her Facebook wall contains a few posts from
them. Maybe this attorney, at one time or another, rejected the requests
of criminal defense counsel to be “friends”—for perfectly innocent
reasons such as “I do not really know you,” “I do not see you
frequently,” or “I forgot to accept the friend request.” According to
Opinion 66, this hypothetical situation would require the new judge to
disqualify herself on any criminal cases involving the attorneys with
whom she is online friends. She would even have to recuse herself if the
prosecutor in a case she hears is a new assistant district attorney hired
241. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 4–6.
242. Id. at 11.
243. Id.; see also John M. Annese, Staten Island Criminal Court Judge to Be Transferred to
Manhattan After Facebook Postings, Sources Say, Staten Island Advance, Oct. 15, 2009,
http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/criminal_court_judge_to_be_tra.html (detailing how
Judge Matthew Sciarrino was transferred because of his Facebook page, which allowed the public to
view aspects of his private life and “blow-by-blow details of his location and schedule”). In addition, a
judge may not be anonymous when she puts something online. See Leila Atassi, Cuyahoga County
Judge Shirley Strickland Saffold Files $50 Million Lawsuit Against The Plain Dealer and Others,
Cleveland.com
(Apr.
8,
2010,
12:00
AM),
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2010/04/
cuyahoga_county_judge_shirley.html (discussing the suit of Judge Shirley Strickland against The Plain
Dealer, an Ohio newspaper, for publishing registration information and revealing that a certain
username made comments—which included comments about cases before the judge—and that the
particular username was registered to an email address linked to the judge).
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just out of law school, one whom the she had seen only once at the DA’s
office but whose “friend” request she had accepted before leaving.
This is a flawed approach, especially if the hypothetical is changed
to address an area of law in which specialized knowledge is particularly
useful. In fact, for this particular hypothetical, the California Code of
244
Civil Procedure would not require recusal. In a specialized area of law,
the relevant limitation is a two-year wait before hearing cases involving
245
attorneys in the judge’s former firm or private practice. For a situation
like this, especially one involving a firm, the California Commission on
246
Judicial Performance advises disclosure and caution.
This is not to say that a criminal defense attorney would have no
concerns in the hypothetical situation described above, but the point is
that the new judge’s online social network is not what created the issue.
Instead, the actual facts surrounding the relationship may give rise to a
need for disclosure or recusal. The social network at issue should make
some difference as well—a connection on LinkedIn is probably less
concerning than an intimate connection on Facebook or the judge
following the attorney on Twitter. And in the future it may be that online
relationships are assumed, especially as increasing numbers of people use
online social networks. Again, the test for self-recusal is whether a judge
“believes there is a substantial doubt as to his or her capacity to be
impartial” or whether “[a] person aware of the facts might reasonably
247
entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.”
In addition, the California opinion should have expanded on what it
believes is proper or improper for a judge. It seems axiomatic that a
248
judge should not act like a college student, but one would hope the
judge would refrain from doing so regardless. Alcohol is certainly a
249
sensitive issue for judges, which perhaps is why the example about a
judge refraining from posting pictures of or herself “engaging in drunken
244. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.1(a) (2010) (“A judge shall be disqualified if . . . . he or she
personally advised or in any way represented the public agency concerning the factual or legal issues in
the proceeding.”).
245. Id. § 170.1(a)(2)(B).
246. For example, the Commission issued an advisory letter in the case of a judge who presided
over a case in which one of the attorneys was his former law partner. The Commission concluded that
because “the judge had left the partnership somewhat more than two years earlier, the judge was not
automatically disqualified,” but that “the relationship should have been disclosed on the record.”
State of Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 1993 Annual Report 19 (1993).
247. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.1(a)(6)(A)(ii)–(iii).
248. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 5 (2010).
249. Indeed, the California Code of Judicial Ethics makes special mention of the reporting
requirement for misdemeanors involving alcohol, controlled substances, and prescriptions. See Cal.
Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3D(3) (2009); see also In re Judge Donald R. Alvarez, Cal. Comm’n
on Judicial Performance, at 3 (2005) (“To protect the public, when a judge is charged with an alcoholrelated charge, it is the commission’s policy to investigate not only the charged incident but also
whether there is a substance abuse problem that is affecting the judge’s performance of judicial
duties.”).
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revelry” appeared obvious to the writers of Opinion 66. The example
251
is, however, a bit extreme. A judge, however, should follow the general
rule of avoiding demeaning the judicial office. The test Rothman gives is
an excellent one: “Write yourself the worst headline about this thought or
action that you can think of for the next day’s newspaper . . . . If this gives
252
you pause, then you probably have an issue relating to ethics.” Judges
253
should especially consider this test when attempting to use humor.
A nuanced approach to judicial ethics would be better as well. The
California Committee attempted to do this by setting forth a number of
254
factors to consider. This proposal was an intriguing start, though the
fourth factor, how regularly the attorney appears before the judge,
should be removed from the test for the appearance of impropriety
because continual appearances before a judge do not necessarily lead to
any appearance of bias unless the judge explicitly mentions a dislike of
the attorney (or vice versa). The nature of the social networking site and
profile are relevant (that is, whether they are professional or personal),
as is the judge’s practice of determining who to include. To a degree, this
also means that the number of Facebook friends a judge has is relevant,
though this is probably enveloped by the other factors. For example, if a
judge’s profile is recently created but includes anyone who wants to be
“friends” with the judge, it would probably be acceptable, as would be
the professional profile of a judge who has a policy of accepting as
“friends” only attorneys within her jurisdiction. The most important
factor seems to be who the judge includes in her network.
Judges should consider following the approach of Judge Criss. She
has a personal Facebook profile that appears to be of a personal
255
256
nature, but avoids politics and talking about any cases. She also
accepts all lawyers who “friend” her and follows all of the relevant
250. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 5 (2010).
251. In addition, the California Committee does not define “drunken revelry” anywhere. A picture
of a judge drinking may be ambiguous—it can be impossible to tell if the judge is “engaged in revelry”
or not.
252. Rothman, supra note 12, § 1.66, at 32; see also LaRoe, supra note 9 (discussing the policy of
Magistrate Judge Nandor Vadas).
253. Marshall Rudolph, Judicial Humor: A Laughing Matter?, 41 Hastings L.J. 175, 187 (1989)
(noting the danger of judges attempting humor on the bench). Judicial attempts at humor off the
bench also are not always received well. In general, judges should use this test before they act. See,
e.g., In re Ellender, 889 So. 2d 225, 227–28 (La. 2004) (disciplining a white judge for wearing a
blackface mask at a Halloween party as part of his prisoner costume, while his wife was dressed as a
police officer). But see In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 632 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The
mere fact that a statement takes the form of a joke does not render it misconduct; humor is the pepper
spray in the arsenal of persuasive literary ordnance: It is often surprising, disarming and, when
delivered with precision, highly effective.”).
254. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 8 (2010).
255. Kennedy, supra note 228 (noting that Judge Criss posts pictures of things like her dog chewing
her slippers).
256. McDonough, supra note 227 (detailing Judge Criss’s policy).
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257

ethical canons of her state. While she has not expanded to other sites, a
judge using other sites could follow similar guidelines. Indeed, it appears
that recent appointees do an excellent job of policing themselves, similar
258
to Judge Criss, especially avoiding political posts.
The guidelines given by Kentucky, New York, and Ohio are similar
to Judge Criss’s approach. All three opinions expressed concerns
regarding the nature of online social networking (for example,
heightened issues of an appearance of impropriety, potentially greater
danger of comments on cases, and the need to maintain a high standard
of conduct) but did not decide that there was any difference between
online social networking and other contact with attorneys. This is a good
approach: The judge should be aware of issues but still know the
respective judicial code applies. There should not be any special rules for
online connections.
While a judge could use an approach like Judge Criss’s social
networking sites like Facebook, there is a need for a nuanced analysis of
the individual social networking sites because of the different nature of
each. For example, on Twitter, connections are not mutual, making who
259
the judge chooses to follow a more involved ethical choice. If the judge
has a policy, however, of following any attorney who chooses to follow
her, or perhaps a policy of following only organizations that are not
political in nature, it is likely acceptable. A judge should be able to
follow biased organizations relating to “improvement of the law, the
260
legal system, or the administration of justice” if the judge also follows
the other side. For example, if a judge follows a local district attorney’s
office and a local public defender’s office (assuming both are using
Twitter), this would be acceptable. This is an area the California
Committee should analyze in more detail to test the limits of what else
may be acceptable.
The analysis for LinkedIn is short: consider the judge’s practice of
including certain people. There are also possible ethical issues with what
a judge posts, but this issue is not unique to this site. Here, the ethical
issue is more about the effect of having a judge included in an attorney’s
network. The interesting question—unexplored by this Note—is whether
this would be enough to qualify as endorsing the attorney or
recommending the attorney, as judges have special rules for
261
recommendations because of the prestige of the judicial office.
257. Id.
258. See LaRoe, supra note 9 (discussing the way recent appointees change the substance of their
posts after joining the bench).
259. This raises possible issues of endorsement and may, therefore, violate Canon 2B of the
California Code of Judicial Ethics.
260. This language is used frequently throughout the California Code of Judicial Ethics. See, e.g.,
Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4C(2) (2009).
261. See id. Canon 2B.
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The analysis for MySpace likely would be similar to the analysis for
Facebook. The sites are fairly similar, though perhaps the different user
262
base raises other issues.
The analysis for Google+ would depend on what action the judge is
taking. Posts would be subject to the same scrutiny mentioned in
discussing the other social networks. What is different, however, is the way
people connect on Google+. As mentioned, Google+ allows a user to
separate contacts into “circles” which means that a judge would be able to
separate attorneys into separate circles or post things that only a certain
263
group of people could see, as is possible on Twitter. This could lessen
the chance of an ex parte communication (for example, the judge could
avoid looking at a certain circle or have a special circle for attorneys
264
appearing before them).

Conclusion
Given the ubiquity of these sites today, it is safe to say that there are
many judges in California using online social networking of some kind and
that this number will continue to grow. The use of social networking sites
by judges to make connections should not be restricted. The California
Committee suggested that it is acceptable for judges to use social
networking and to be online friends with attorneys generally, but not to be
“friends” with an attorney appearing before the judge. This conclusion is
flawed from both a legal and policy perspective. Instead, as many other
states agree, judges should be able to use these sites at all times—as long as
the judges adhere to their respective code of conduct—even when an
attorney included in their online social network appears before them.
The California Committee should release a new opinion to correct
and supplement Opinion 66. This new opinion should include a more
nuanced approach to online social networking that considers the
differences in the various types of social networking sites. It should also
include a new test for possible recusal in the specific area of social
networking and a new set of guidelines for judges using online social
networking. A new test for recusal should consider each social networking
site individually, the different possible actions on each site, and would have
to include some kind of analysis of the actual relationship between the
judge and the attorney.

262. See Harris, supra note 49 (“MySpace is still rather popular among individuals who end up in
the criminal justice system.”). Furthermore, there is at least one judge who searches social networking
profiles of adjudicated offenders, something that would logically lead to searches of MySpace—
although the legality of this practice has not been analyzed. Richard Acello, Web 2.Uh-oh, A.B.A. J.
(Dec. 1, 2009, 9:29 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/web_2.uh-oh/.
263. See Hartman, supra note 54 (describing the “double filter” model and noting it is very similar
to Twitter).
264. Of course, this site is still developing, so it will be interesting to see what other features develop.
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